On 2 November, when they opened their banking app, almost three million Paraguayans found they could no longer do anything. No transfers, no withdrawals, no card payments. Their bank, Ueno Bank, had just been placed into resolution by the Central Bank of Paraguay, and all deposits were frozen.
Ueno was no small local lender. Launched as a digital bank, it had become one of the most widely used banks in the country within a few years, serving a large share of the adult population. It also managed considerable sums of public money: around USD 800 to 850 million according to local and international media, including some USD 355 to 380 million belonging to the Social Security Institute, the public fund that pays pensions and finances healthcare for millions of workers.
According to the Central Bank, Ueno's solvency ratio had fallen to 5.56%, less than half the legal minimum of 12%. The decision was taken unanimously by its board. Within hours, a bank presented as the symbol of Paraguay's financial modernity had become the centre of the country's worst political and financial crisis in years.
The affair immediately turned political. Until March 2025, Ueno belonged to the Vázquez group, in which President Santiago Peña held shares, according to documents reviewed by the daily ABC Color. The president had also appointed a former Ueno executive to head the Central Bank; he resigned after the resolution. Both the president and the bank deny any wrongdoing.
Within three days, the situation became untenable. Eight bank executives were detained. On 5 November, Santiago Peña announced his resignation. A few hours later, the Chamber of Deputies voted unanimously, 78 to 0, to impeach him, and prosecutors opened three criminal investigations into him and other former officials.

For the vast majority of customers, the money is not lost. The deposit guarantee fund covers up to 228.3 million guaraníes per person per bank, around USD 37,700 according to MercoPress. Official estimates suggest about 97% of depositors are fully covered. Banking law provides for repayment within 15 days, extendable once by another 15 days. To speed things up, the Senate has approved a reform allowing an advance of up to 40 minimum wages within 24 hours, which still has to pass the lower house.
But for anyone with more, nothing is guaranteed. The Central Bank has not promised full repayment of larger balances: they will depend on the resolution process and possibly a liquidation. Those most exposed are precisely the better-off: entrepreneurs, wealthier savers, and foreigners living in Paraguay who had put their savings in a bank seen as modern and safe.
The word "confiscation" is circulating widely on social media. Legally, that is not what this is: it is a freeze on deposits as part of a bank resolution process. But for a saver who cannot touch their money for weeks, without knowing how much they will get back, the distinction is thin.

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For investors, the Ueno episode is a warning that goes far beyond the bank itself.
First, it exposes how fragile the line between political power and the financial system can be. When a president has been linked, even indirectly, to the group that owned a major bank, and when the Central Bank is entrusted to a former executive of that same bank, a simple question arises: who was really overseeing the risks? In a country where banking supervision is supposed to protect savers, that kind of proximity is exactly what foreign investors fear.
Second, it hits public money. Hundreds of millions of dollars from the public pension and health fund are frozen. This is no longer just a matter for depositors: it is a question of public finances and social stability.
Third, it damages an image the country spent years building. In July 2024, Moody's raised Paraguay to Baa3, the first rung of investment grade, and S&P has since rated it BBB-. That was recognition of its macroeconomic stability. The Central Bank insists the crisis is limited to Ueno. Rating agencies and international investors will now be watching very closely to see whether that holds.
At FFI, we study many countries before recommending one to our clients. Paraguay is one of them. We looked at it closely and decided not to go there. The Ueno affair has not changed our mind: it confirms our reservations.
To be fair, the country has genuine economic strengths. Growth reached 4.2% in 2024 and around 5% in 2025. Taxation is light, with income and corporate taxes around 10%. Hydroelectric power is abundant and cheap. The cost of living is low. On paper, the picture is attractive.
But several factors held us back.
An economy that is hard to read. A large share of activity escapes official statistics. According to the US Congressional Research Service, informal work accounts for more than 60% of the labour force. Some unofficial estimates put the illicit economy at between a quarter and half of GDP. When such a large part of the economy is invisible, it becomes very hard to measure a country's real strength, the health of its businesses and the true level of housing demand.
A drug-trafficking hub. Paraguay has long been identified as a major transit zone for cocaine from neighbouring countries: the United Nations estimated fifteen years ago that 30 to 40 tonnes passed through each year. In 2022, Paraguayan prosecutor Marcelo Pecci, who specialised in organised crime and money laundering, was murdered in Colombia while on his honeymoon. The operation he helped launch had led to the seizure of more than USD 100 million in assets. The US State Department notes that money laundering prosecutions remain rare, partly because of corruption. For an investor, that means an environment where the origin of capital is hard to verify, prices can be distorted, and reputational risk is real.

Far from everything, and little tourism. Asunción is more than 10,000 kilometres from most European capitals and even further from the Gulf, with a single direct flight to Europe, from Madrid. And the country attracts few long-haul visitors. Paraguay did record 3.66 million international visitors in 2025, but almost 45% were day-trippers and 80% came from Argentina, largely drawn by cross-border shopping. International leisure tourism remains marginal. The paradox is striking: Paraguay is surrounded by some of the continent's most popular destinations, the Iguazú Falls, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Patagonia, yet offers few reasons of its own to make the trip. For a property investor, that is decisive: without tourism, there is no solid short-term rental market, and rental demand rests entirely on the local economy.
Paraguay's growth figures are often cited in its favour. They are real. But for a property investor, the question is not just whether a country is growing: it is what that growth rests on, and whether it feeds the housing demand you are targeting.
Paraguay's economy rests first and foremost on agricultural commodities and electricity. In 2022, agricultural products accounted for almost 68% of exports. Soybeans, beef and hydropower from the giant Itaipú and Yacyretá dams, shared with Brazil and Argentina, are its pillars. Exported electricity has historically provided around a fifth of the country's external revenues, beef around a tenth.
The weakness of this model is obvious: it depends on the weather and on world prices. In 2022, the worst drought in the country's history cut soybean output by 60% and soybean exports by almost 59%, to USD 1.2 billion. Annual growth fell to 0.1%, and several banks had even forecast a recession. An economy whose health depends so heavily on a single harvest does not offer the visibility a property investor needs over ten or fifteen years.

Another part of the economy depends on cross-border trade. Ciudad del Este, where Paraguay meets Brazil and Argentina, lives largely from reselling imported goods to shoppers from neighbouring countries, attracted by price and tax differences. It is a dynamic but volatile business, highly sensitive to exchange rates and to neighbours' policy decisions, and one that does not lend itself to transparency.
What creates solid, lasting rental demand is skilled jobs, a growing middle class, students, expatriates and tourists. Those drivers exist in Paraguay, but they remain modest compared with export agriculture and border trade. In other words, the country's economic appeal is real, but in our view it does not rest on the criteria that make a good property market for a foreign investor.
Buying in Paraguay is easy. Selling is much harder. And that is often what sellers forget to mention.
Asunción has seen a genuine apartment construction boom in recent years. According to the local business press, development is growing by 25 to 35% a year, the supply of apartments is rising by around 15% a year, and more than 6,000 new units are due to be delivered within two years in a radius of barely one kilometre, in the capital's most sought-after neighbourhoods.
The problem is that this supply does not necessarily match local demand. According to a survey reported by ABC Color, only 27% of Paraguayans questioned want to live in an apartment, while 73% prefer a house. A large share of new buildings is bought by investors, local or foreign, rather than by families who want to live there. The day those investors all want to sell, who will buy?
On top of that, mortgage lending barely exists. Mortgages account for only about 4.5% of the Paraguayan banking system's loan book, and only 26% of residents say getting one is easy. Most purchases are made in cash or with direct developer financing over a few years. The pool of potential buyers is therefore narrow: mainly wealthy households able to pay cash, and other investors.
For a foreign investor who wants to recover their capital in five or ten years, that is a major risk. A property that is hard to sell is one whose price and exit timing you do not control. And the Ueno crisis is likely to make banks even more cautious, and buyers even scarcer.

That leaves the rental yield argument. Sellers readily quote gross yields of 6 to 8%, sometimes more. Other local sources are far more cautious: figures reported by the daily La Nación put returns on traditional residential rentals at 3 to 4% a year.
The truth probably lies somewhere in between, and it depends heavily on location. But even on favourable assumptions, it is important to understand what is being quoted. A gross yield ignores service charges, management, tax and vacancy. Yet apartment occupancy in Asunción is around 85% according to industry professionals: one unit in seven is empty at any given time. And with a wave of new supply arriving, competition between landlords can only intensify, putting pressure on rents.
Short-term rental offers no real alternative. With little international tourism, it relies mainly on business travellers and regional visitors. Available data show just over 2,000 active listings on booking platforms in Asunción, with occupancy of around 62%.
Decent returns, then, but not exceptional ones. And above all, not enough to compensate for the market's opacity, the difficulty of selling, the distance and the country risk. By comparison, in Batumi we see net rental yields of 8 to 12% after costs and vacancy, in a market with real tourist and residential demand and where mortgages are available to foreigners.
Finally, there is a promise often heard from some sellers: "Buy an apartment in Paraguay, get residency, and stop paying tax at home." It is one of the most misleading claims on the market.
Immigration residency and tax residency are two different things. Paraguay does make it fairly easy to obtain a residence permit, including through investment. But that permit does not make you a Paraguayan tax resident. To obtain a tax residency certificate, the Paraguayan authorities require, among other things, registration as a taxpayer, up-to-date tax filings and a record of your entries and exits from the country for the period concerned. In other words, you have to actually live there.
Above all, it is not Paraguay that decides whether you remain taxable in your home country: your home country does. In France, you remain tax resident if your home, your main activity or the centre of your economic interests stays in France; one criterion is enough. The UK applies its statutory residence test, based on days spent in the country and ties such as family, accommodation and work. The United States taxes its citizens wherever they live. An apartment in Asunción and a residence card change nothing if your family, your work or most of your assets remain at home. Where there is no tax treaty with Paraguay, as is the case for France, there is no rule to settle a conflict between the two countries. Paraguay has also joined the multilateral convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters, which organises information exchange between tax authorities.
Becoming non-resident for tax purposes is possible, but it means genuinely moving, with your life, your activity and your interests. No property purchase can replace that. Those who claim otherwise expose their clients to serious tax reassessments.
The Ueno affair illustrates exactly the criteria that guide our choices. Before recommending a market, we look at the strength and independence of its banking system, the transparency of its economy, the stability of its institutions, the liquidity of its property market and the reality of its rental demand, especially from tourism.
Those are the criteria on which we chose Georgia. Its two leading banks are listed on the London Stock Exchange, publish audited accounts under international standards and have reported profits up 20% this year. The currency is stable, and the National Bank expects a strong lari until 2029. The country welcomes several million international visitors a year, and Batumi, on the Black Sea, combines tourism with residential demand. Find out more on our page about investing in Georgia.
Actual repayment of guaranteed deposits, and the fate of balances above the guarantee. Adoption of the reform allowing a 24-hour advance. The outcome of the criminal investigations. The reaction of rating agencies, which could review the country's rating if the crisis spreads. And the ability of Paraguay's institutions to get through this period without further shocks.
Paraguay has strengths, and no one disputes its economic dynamism. But the collapse of Ueno Bank is a reminder that a growth rate and light taxation are not enough to make a good investment destination. Confidence in the banks, economic transparency, solid institutions and genuine demand matter just as much. On those points, Paraguay does not meet our standards today. And no promise of easy tax residency will ever replace those fundamentals.
Strong banks, stable institutions, genuine rental demand: these are the criteria we use to select markets. Let's take 30 minutes to talk. The first conversation comes with no commitment.